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Abstract 
 
There is evidence that countries trade votes among each other in international institutions on a 
wide range of issues, including the use of force, trade issues and elections of judges. Vote-trading 
has been criticized as being a form of corruption, undue influence and coercion. Contrary to 
common wisdom, however, I argue in this paper that the case for introducing policy measures 
against vote-trading cannot be made out on the basis of available evidence. This paper sets out an 
analytical framework for analyzing vote-trading in international institutions, focusing on three 
major contexts in which vote-trading may generate benefits and costs: (1) agency costs (collective 
good), (2) coercive tendering and (3) agency costs (constituents). The applicability of each context 
depends primarily on the type of decision in question – i.e. preference-decision or judgment-
decision – and the interests that countries are expected to maximize when voting. The analytical 
framework is applied to evidence of vote-trading in four institutions, the Security Council, the 
General Assembly, the World Trade Organization and the International Whaling Commission. The 
application of the analysis reveals that while vote-trading can create significant costs, there is only 
equivocal evidence to this effect, and in several cases vote-trading generates important benefits. 
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VOTE-TRADING IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Ofer Eldar 
 
1. Introduction 
Vote-trading is prevalent in international institutions. Vote-trading is largely unregulated, and the 
incentives to sell and buy votes can be particularly high. There is evidence that countries trade 
votes among each other on a wide range of issues, including, the use of force, trade issues and 
elections of judges. Vote-trading in international institutions often involves deals between wealthy 
countries and poor countries. Poor countries have a greater incentive to sell their votes because 
payments are usually worth more to a poor country than to a wealthy country.1 Furthermore, 
current voting rules based on the equality of sovereigns provide extensive voting powers to many 
small countries on matters that they care little about.2 Therefore, small countries have a strong 
incentive to sell their votes. There is also an extensive demand for votes, as the decisions of 
international institutions have a growing impact on countries. Wealthy countries have ample 
resources to buy votes, and the price of votes is not necessarily high. The superpowers, especially 
the US, can buy poorer countries’ votes by utilizing their aid allocations or securing loans from the 
World Bank or the IMF,3 and the price for a vote is often a vote on another issue. 
The practice of vote-trading usually carries a moral stigma. Vote-trading is widely criticized by 
commentators as being a form of corruption, undue influence, and even coercion. In most 
countries there are domestic laws that prohibit agreements based on the exchange of goods or 
money for votes. There is also an ongoing international effort to stop voting transactions in 
elections in developing countries.4 Common wisdom would thus suggest that the practice of vote-
trading should be made illegal in international law as in domestic systems. Contrary to this view, 
however, I argue in this paper that the case for introducing policy measures against vote-trading in 
international institutions cannot be made on the basis of available evidence. While vote-trading 
can create significant costs, it can also generate important benefits. There is only equivocal 
evidence to suggest that the costs outweigh the benefits, and in certain instances the evidence 
indicates that vote-trading is welfare-maximizing.  
In Part 2, I set out an analytical framework for analyzing vote-trading in international 
institutions. The main criterion I use in this paper is efficiency or global welfarism.5 In particular, I 
seek to identify the various costs and benefits of vote-trading and the contexts in which such costs 
and benefits may arise. I identify three specific contexts in which vote-trading has economic 
effects: (1) agency costs (collective good), (2) coercive tendering, and (3) agency costs 
                                                 
1
 For an explanation in the context of domestic vote-trading, see Richard L. Hasen, ‘Vote Buying’, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 
(2000) 1323, at 1329. 
2
 John H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, 97 AJIL (2003) 782, at 797. 
This paper does not discuss reform of voting mechanisms.  
3
 Such loans are more valuable to recipient countries than they are costly to the major shareholders, especially the 
US; Erik Voeten, ‘Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action’, 95(4) American Political Science 
Review (2001) 845, at 853. In this paper I ignore the potentially harmful effect of such vote-trading on decisions of the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
4
 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report (2004), at 76-87. 
5
 The welfare or wellbeing of the global community as a whole, including its member states and people, needs to be 
considered. For a discussion of welfarism in international law, see Eric Posner, 'International Law: A Welfarist 
Approach', 73(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. (2006) 487. 
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(constituents). The main factor in determining which of these three contexts is relevant in specific 
cases is the type of voting decision in question and the interests that each country is expected to 
maximize when voting. In each of the three contexts vote-trading can have both beneficial and 
harmful effects. In addition to welfarism, I discuss the distributional effects of vote-trading in 
specific contexts where it may increase inequalities among countries.6 In Part 3, I apply the 
analytical framework to specific case studies in four international institutions: the Security 
Council (‘SC’), the General Assembly (‘GA’), the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) and the 
International Whaling Commission (‘IWC’). I have chosen these institutions because there is solid 
evidence of vote-trading in each of these institutions and because these institutions engage in a 
wide array of international activities. Part 4 concludes.  
 
2. Analytical Framework 
This part is divided into three sections. The first defines the various categories of vote-trading. The 
second defines the two main types of decisions that international institutions are responsible for: 
preference-decisions and judgment-decisions. The third sets out the main contexts in which vote-
trading has economic consequences and the type of decision and circumstances in which such 
consequences will arise.  
 
A. Categories of Vote-Trading 
Vote-trading may take the form of two main types of exchanges. The first type is outright vote-
buying, which I define as any conditioning of value on voting for a particular outcome, except 
logrolling (as defined below). Vote-buying may take the form of one country offering payment to 
another to vote in a particular way (‘carrot’). It may also take the form of a threat by a country 
(short of direct coercion7) to withhold a certain benefit ('stick'), e.g. bilateral aid, the consideration 
for the vote being the continued provision of that benefit.8 The second type of vote-trading is 
logrolling. Logrolling differs from vote-buying in that the consideration for the vote is a vote on 
another issue. V1 votes on issue A for an outcome favored by V2, and in exchange V2 votes on 
issue B for an outcome favored by V1.9 Logrolling may involve exchanges of votes within the 
same institution ('internal-logrolling'), but it may also involve an exchange of a vote in one 
institution for a vote in another institution ('external-logrolling'). I emphasize that I make no 
distinction between votes and decisions. Thus I treat cases where countries form a logrolling 
majority to pass a package of decisions, although there is only one formal vote on these decisions, 
and cases where there is a separate vote in respect of each different decision and countries enter 
logrolling agreements prior to the vote on each decision, in the same way. I use the term logrolling 
to refer to any and all types of logrolling. I use the term vote-trading to refer to any and all types of 
                                                 
6
 I limit the discussion of the distributional effects to cases where vote-trading maximizes welfare, but harms the 
poor. In these cases, the welfare analysis on its own is unsatisfactory for determining policy. 
7
 I define 'direct coercion' as a threat by a country to do something which it is not entitled to do under international 
legal norms. 
8
 It may be argued that threats to withdraw benefits constitute coercion. However, international law does not 
prohibit such threats. While poor countries may be dependent on bilateral benefits, in the absence of a legal duty to 
provide these benefits, their withdrawal may be regarded as a legitimate use of donors’ resources. 
9
 I use the term 'vote-buyer' to refer not only to countries engaged in vote-buying, but also to countries engaged in 
logrolling. A country that wishes decision A to be adopted will buy a vote on decision A and will sell its vote on 
decision B. 
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vote-trading.10 
 
B. Categories of Decisions 
The decisions of international institutions may be divided into two main types. The first type is 
'preference-decisions'. In preference-decisions, countries are expected to vote in accordance with 
their individual interests or preferences in order to maximize their individual gains. Voters have no 
duty to consider the collective good or the interests of other countries when they choose how to 
vote. Thus there is no risk that the collective good will be compromised when countries pursue 
their individual interests. Most voting decisions in the domestic context are preference-decisions. 
In domestic elections people can vote for their preferred candidates without considering how their 
vote would affect others.11 By contrast, there are only few voting decisions in international 
institutions that are preference-decisions, most notably, as explained below, the decisions of the 
WTO. I also emphasize that in international institutions the actual voters are governments. While 
governments have no duty towards other countries, they are expected to maximize the benefit to 
their own constituents. 
The second type of decisions is ‘judgment-decisions’. In judgment-decisions, countries are 
expected to consider the collective good or the interests of other governments and peoples rather 
than their own individual interests. Such decisions involve a judgment as to which result would 
best serve the interests of the international community. In judgment-decisions, voters have a duty 
to vote for decisions that maximize the collective good. Voters act as agents for other governments 
and peoples to consider the latter's interests and maximize their sum preferences. In the domestic 
context, relatively few voting decisions are judgment-decisions. For example, judges cannot 
exercise their subjective preferences when deciding a case, but need to consider the collective 
good in accordance with certain laws and norms. By contrast, in the international context, many 
decisions are judgment-decisions. As I discuss below, countries in the SC, the GA and the IWC 
have an express duty to maximize the collective good in making certain decisions. 
I emphasize that the distinction between preference-decisions and judgment-decisions is not 
always easy to make and is to some extent a matter of degree. Nonetheless, for the sake of 
convenience, I will assume that the distinction is clear-cut and seek to categorize the decisions of 
each institution as either preference-decisions or judgment-decisions. 
 
C. Rationale For and Against Vote-Trading 
The reasons for restricting or permitting vote-trading in the domestic context have been 
extensively discussed in other scholarly work.12 In summary, it is fair to state that while most 
commentators believe that vote-buying in political decisions, such as elections, should be 
prohibited, opinions on the practice of logrolling are more equivocal. There is a greater divergence 
of opinion, though, as to why vote-buying and logrolling should or should not be prohibited. I do 
                                                 
10  I also note that the term 'bloc' or 'coalition' may involve vote-trading, but also countries voting for a common 
interest. 
11
 Another example of preference-decisions is voting by shareholders in corporations. 
12
 See Hasen, supra note 1; Saul Levmore, ‘Voting with Intensity’, 53 Stan. L. Rev. (2000) 111; Ettore Scimemi, 
‘Vote-trading in Corporate America’, 14(4) EBLR (2003) 445; Thomas Stratmann, ‘Logrolling’, in Dennis Mueller 
(ed), Perspectives on Public Choice Theory (1997) 322; Zohar Goshen, ‘Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule 
or Liability Rule?’, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1997) 741; Kochin & Kochin, ‘When is Buying Votes Wrong?’, 97 Public 
Choice (1998) 645.  
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not seek to assess this literature in this paper. While I draw in some instances on arguments made 
in the domestic context, I focus on dealing with the specific issues that vote-trading entails in 
international institutions.  
In examining vote-trading the main criterion I employ is welfarism. The basic starting point of 
welfarism is that vote-trading, like any other transaction, maximizes welfare. A vote-trading 
agreement presumptively increases the wellbeing of the parties to the agreement. The basic 
presumption can be modified or supplemented in three different contexts: First, in judgment-
decisions, vote-trading can generate benefits or costs to the international community at large. 
Second, in preference-decisions, coercive tendering practices employed by vote-buyers can 
impose costs on vote-sellers and other third parties, where vote-sellers are forced to sell their votes 
for unfair prices, but they can also generate efficient decisions and obstruct holdout attempts. 
Third, in preference-decisions, vote-trading can generate costs or benefits for the constituents of 
the vote-traders themselves. In the following sub-sections I discuss each of these contexts in 
greater detail. 
I emphasize that vote-trading may also have distributional effects. In the context of agency 
costs (collective good) and agency costs (constituents), distributional issues are already 
incorporated into the welfare analysis to the extent that distributional considerations need to be 
considered in assessing the effects of vote-trading on the collective good or welfare of 
constituents, and therefore a distributional analysis is unlikely to add much over and above the 
welfare analysis. By contrast, as I explain below, distributional concerns are analytically 
significant in the context of coercive tendering in preference-decisions. Accordingly, I discuss 
distributional concerns only in the context of coercive tendering. 
 
1. Agency Costs (Collective Good) 
We need to examine in which circumstances the pursuit of individual interests through vote-
trading harms or benefits the collective good. This primarily depends on the type of decision in 
question. 
 
(a) Preference-decisions:  
In preference-decisions, no harm is caused to the collective good when countries trade their votes 
to further their interests, as countries are expected to pursue their own interests anyway. In fact, 
subject to other costs discussed below, vote-trading maximizes aggregate welfare. Vote-trading 
not only increases the wellbeing of the parties to the agreement, but also allows voters to register 
the intensity of their preferences by enabling them to sell votes when they do not care much about 
the outcome and buy votes on matters they feel strongly about.13 A system that registers intensity 
of preferences is prima facie more efficient because it better reflects the aggregate of individual 
preferences.14 
 
                                                 
13
 Stratmann, Ibid., at 325; Hasen, Ibid., at 1343.  
14
 Kochin & Kochin, supra note 12. In specific preference-decisions any vote-trading transaction may inflict costs on 
others, and such costs may be larger than the benefits to the parties to the vote-trading; for mathematical expositions 
see Hasen, supra note 1; Scimemi, supra note 12. However, as Kochin and Kochin show, there is no reason to believe 
a priori that on average such costs will be larger than the benefits. The key issue is to identify the circumstances where 
vote-trading generates more costs than benefits. As discussed below, in international vote-trading, I identify these 
circumstances to exist in the context of coercive tendering practices under certain conditions.  
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(b) Judgment-decisions:  
In judgment-decisions the question is whether vote-trading generates outcomes that reduce or 
maximize the collective good. Countries generally enter into vote-trading agreements to further 
their own interests.15 When the pursuit of self-interest via vote-trading comes at the expense of the 
collective good, vote-trading entails agency costs. Some agency costs, though, are already inherent 
in many judgment-decisions because, even without vote-trading, countries already vote inevitably 
with a view to maximizing their individual preferences at the expense of the collective good. The 
effects of vote-trading in judgment-decisions thus depend on a comparison of the result but for the 
vote-trading and the result facilitated by the vote-trading from the standpoint of the collective 
good. Accordingly, vote-trading is harmful when it leads to decisions ('bad-decisions') that are 
more harmful to the collective good than the decisions that would otherwise be adopted or the 
overall result if no such decisions were adopted. This would happen where, but for the vote-
trading, countries would vote for decisions that better maximize the collective good ('good-
decisions').16 Countries have preferences for good-decisions ('good-preferences') for two main 
reasons. The first is altruism, which I define as a concern for the collective good. However, as 
pointed out by Posner, altruism in international relations is generally weak.17 The second is 
individual interest in a good-decision, i.e., the country will benefit from a decision that maximizes 
the collective good.  
Vote-trading can actually be welfare-maximizing, when it ameliorates agency costs caused by 
countries voting in their self-interest. This type of effect will occur where, but for the vote-trading, 
countries would vote for decisions that maximize their own personal interests (also, 'bad-
decisions'), in circumstances where the vote-trading itself provides them with an incentive to vote 
for decisions that would better maximize the collective good (also, 'good-decisions'). When a 
country is faced with a choice whether to vote for a good-decision that is contrary to its individual 
interests or a bad-decision that promotes its interests, it is very likely to form a preference for the 
latter ('bad-preference')18 rather than the former (i.e., a good-preference). The consideration for the 
vote can provide an incentive for a country with a bad-preference to vote for a good-decision. One 
possibility is that a vote-buyer will buy votes of countries with bad-preferences in order to pursue 
a good-decision (the 'benevolent vote-buyer'). Take, for example, a vote-buyer that buys the votes 
of a small minority that insists on blocking a good-decision. The benevolent vote-buyer's good 
preferences will not necessarily derive from altruism, but can - and usually will - derive also from 
its own individual interests. A second possibility is where two countries (or two different blocs of 
countries) that have opposing preferences commit to vote for a package of policies that maximize 
the collective good (an 'efficient logrolling compromise') instead of voting their own bad-
preferences in specific decisions. Any country is concerned that if it votes its judgment on issues 
that implicate its own interests, it will not only lose on these specific issues, but if other countries 
generally vote their interests, it stands to gain less from its membership in the institution than the 
other countries that free-ride on that country's fulfilling its duty to vote for the collective good. 
                                                 
15
 I ignore in this paper a legal argument that vote-trading in pursuit of self-interest violates per se countries' duty to 
maximize the collective good.  
16
 A good-decision need not be optimal. It is sufficient that it is better than the decision that would be adopted but for 
the vote-trading.  
17
 Posner, supra note 5, at 521-522.  
18
 I assume for the sake of simplicity that bad-preferences always stem from personal interest, though they may also 
stem from mistaken judgments. 
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Logrolling can facilitate welfare-maximizing policies by giving countries the assurance that they 
will not lose to other countries by respecting their duty to vote for the collective good. 
There are two main factors that can influence the pattern and effect of vote-trading transactions. 
The first is countries' preferences. The risk to the collective good is higher where vote-buyers have 
strong bad-preferences and vote-sellers have no preferences at all or weak good-preferences. On 
the other hand, the stronger the good-preferences of the putative vote-sellers, the higher the price 
they will charge for their vote, and the more likely it is that a vote-buyer with a bad-preference 
will not have sufficient resources or willingness to pay this price. Likewise, the stronger the good-
preferences of a benevolent vote-buyer, the more resources it will be ready to invest in order to 
bring about a good-decision.  
Second, to the extent that information is available on vote-trading agreements, countries that 
take part in such agreements can be subject to reputational costs. When information on vote-
trading is available, vote-traders suffer harm to their reputation because they are perceived as 
acting in their self-interest rather than respecting their duty to maximize the collective good. Such 
reputational costs can provide countries with weak incentives to refuse to engage in vote-trading. 
We would expect reputational costs to be higher the greater the actual harm to the collective good 
and lesser when the vote-trading benefits the collective good. However, this will partly depend on 
the specific interests and views of interested countries and NGOs that may not always be the best 
agents of the collective good. Thus, countries and NGOs may criticize and harm the reputation of 
countries engaged in vote-trading that leads to a good-decision if they object to that good-decision.  
I emphasize that the application of the above analysis to specific case studies suffers from two 
methodological problems, which can create uncertainty in evaluating the consequences of vote-
trading.  
First, in order to define the collective good and decide whether or not vote-trading increases or 
reduces it, we must make difficult empirical determinations concerning the aggregate welfare of 
all people. A precise evaluation of global aggregate welfare is not possible. In the absence of an 
accurate measure for making such an evaluation, other proxies have to be used. The wording of 
the relevant treaty is the first place to start in defining the collective good. The treaty will normally 
state the purposes of the institution and its voting decisions, and the considerations that countries 
must take into account when voting. However, the wording of the treaty taken literally may not be 
conclusive. Preferences may have changed over time so that the express wording of the treaty no 
longer fully reflects the collective good, and an expansive interpretation is required in order to 
accommodate changing preferences. It may be necessary to consider other factors as evidence of 
where the collective good lies, including countries' views and practices, global public opinion, 
media reports and empirical intuitions about global consensus. These factors are often subject to 
divergent views, and accordingly which view of the collective good should be adopted will often 
be subject to debate. 
Second, as explained above, when examining the effects of vote-trading on the collective good 
we need to examine the likely outcomes but for the vote-trading. The non-adoption of the decision 
facilitated via vote-trading is not the only consequence to be considered, but also any unilateral 
action or consequence outside the institution which might result if the relevant decision is not 
accepted. Although it is possible to evaluate the political outcomes if not for the vote-trading by 
considering countries' positions and practices as indicators of potential outcomes, estimates of 
such outcomes will inevitably involve some degree of speculation and uncertainty. 
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2. Coercive Tendering 
Vote-trading can give rise to strategic problems of coercive tendering. The effects of coercive 
tendering are particularly relevant in preference-decisions. 
 
(a) Preference-decisions:  
Vote-trading, as explained above, is prima facie efficient in preference-decisions. This 
presumption of efficiency is based on the assumption that parties enter willingly into vote-trading 
agreements. This assumption does not necessarily hold when strategic behavior places voters in a 
situation where they are forced into making coerced choices. A vote is coerced where voters sell 
their vote in circumstances in which they rationally believe that they have no reasonable chance of 
winning the vote. In these circumstances, it is rational for voters to sell their vote even for a price 
which is less than the value of the benefit that they sincerely believe they will obtain by exercising 
their voting right ('fair value'),19 because otherwise they will be left with less valuable or worthless 
rights. However, coercive tendering will not necessarily be inefficient or unfair. As I explain 
below, when putative vote-sellers demand a price, which is higher than the fair value of their 
votes, coercive tendering may be welfare-maximizing. The following discussion considers first the 
elements of coercive tendering, and then explains the circumstances in which coercive tendering is 
inefficient and/or unfair or alternatively leads to efficient results.  
 
i) The elements of coercive tendering:  
Coercive tendering practices are present when three elements are satisfied: a pressure to tender, 
collective action problems, and no competition for votes. 
(1) Pressure to tender: We need to consider the source of the pressure on voters to make 
coerced choices. In vote-trading in domestic systems, such as electorates or public corporations, 
the relative power of each vote to affect outcomes and the benefit to each voter from making an 
informed choice are usually trivial. Thus, there is a strong incentive to sell votes to make some 
gain. Each voter knows that other voters also have a strong incentive to sell their votes. Knowing 
that there is a high probability that other voters will sell their votes and that the vote-buyer will 
win the vote, it is rational for each voter to sell his vote for any price above zero, otherwise he will 
be left with a worthless right. The vote-buyer can therefore attain control over the institution by 
paying trivial prices.20 In vote-trading in international institutions the conditions are different. The 
number of voters in international institutions is not as large as in electorates or public 
corporations. Consequently, the relative value of each vote and the benefit from making informed 
decisions are larger. 
Pressure to tender the vote in international institutions arises from an express or implicit threat 
that the putative vote-seller will be worse off if it does not sell the vote or sells it too late. A useful 
analogy is coercive tendering in corporate takeovers. It is known that when a tender offer is 
accompanied by an express or implicit threat either not to buy the shares at all or to buy at a lower 
price in the future, shareholders may tender their shares even when they believe that the offer price 
is less than the fair value of their shares. In these circumstances, shareholders are faced with a 
                                                 
19
 On the assumption that but for the vote-trading a decision would not have been adopted, the fair value of each vote 
reflects the collective value of the votes that would be sufficient to obtain a favorable decision or block an unfavorable 
one.  
20
   Levmore, supra note12, at 123-125; Goshen, supra note 12, at 774-780; Kochin & Kochin, supra note 12.  
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choice: to accept the price at the front-end, or retain a less valuable minority stake when the 
takeover has been consummated. Many shareholders attach a significant probability to the 
likelihood that other shareholders (faced with the same threat) will tender their shares and the 
takeover will succeed. Thus, it is rational for them to sell immediately even if they value their 
share above the offer price.21 
Coercive tendering in international institutions operates in a similar way. As described below in 
the case of the WTO, there is evidence that powerful countries may use coercive tactics when 
buying votes in order to effect decisions that benefit themselves potentially at the expense of other 
(although not necessarily all) members of the relevant institution. Typically, the putative vote-
buyer offers certain inducements to countries, presumably those that object to its position on the 
vote, in consideration for their agreement to vote in favor of its position. In addition, it makes 
certain threats, for example, that bilateral aid will be withdrawn if a country does not vote as 
requested. The presence of inducements and threats is likely to make countries attach a positive 
probability to the possibility that many other countries will agree to the vote-buyer's proposal and 
that the vote-buyer will win the vote. Therefore, it is rational for voters to sell their votes even if 
the offer price is unfair. 
In one main respect, however, coercive tendering in international institutions differs from 
coercive tendering in corporate takeovers. The distinction between the front-end and the back-end 
in the international context is not as clear-cut as in the corporate context, being mainly one of 
degree. Whenever a vote-buyer manages to buy a vote its chances of attaining the required 
majority increase. If other voters know that the vote-buyer is gradually accumulating votes, the 
belief that the vote-buyer will achieve the required majority increases as well. Presumably, every 
time a vote-buyer acquires a vote other countries increasingly fear that the vote-buyer will achieve 
the necessary majority without buying their vote, and the pressure to sell for a lower price 
increases. Thus we would expect the payment that each voter is offered for its vote to gradually 
diminish as the vote-buyer continues to accumulate votes, whereas in the corporate context, due to 
regulation, all shareholders are entitled to the best price offered to any of them during the tender 
period.22 
(2) Collective action problems: If voters are able to act collectively and coordinate their 
positions vis-à-vis the vote-buyer - even when faced with pressure to sell - they may negotiate for 
a price that reflects the fair collective value of their votes.23 If voters are unable to coordinate their 
positions, they are likely to form the belief that other voters will sell their votes, and therefore it is 
rational for them to do the same.  
The feasibility of collective action depends on several factors. Two potential factors are the size 
of the institution and the voting majority. In electorates or corporations with many shareholders, 
the transaction costs of collective action are very high and often preclusive. In international 
institutions, though, where the number of voters is smaller, the transaction costs of forming 
coalitions are not particularly high. Collective action is therefore feasible even in the largest 
international institutions. Regarding the second factor, the larger the majority required to pass a 
                                                 
21
 Lucian Bebchuk, 'The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and A Proposed Remedy', 12 Del. J. Corp. L. (1987) 911; 
Lucian Bebchuk, 'Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers', 98 Harv. L. Rev. (1985) 
1695.  
22
 Section 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act; Rule 14d-10, Equal Treatment of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 
(2001). 
23
 Bebchuk (1987), supra note 21, at 924; Levmore, supra note 12, at 123; Kochin & Kochin, supra note 12. 
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decision, the smaller the collective action problem because voting-trading has to benefit more 
voters to affect voting outcomes.24 Under a unanimity rule, consensus or a veto system, there is in 
principle no collective action problem, because one or several voters have the right to block 
unfavorable outcomes. However, exercising a veto power or blocking decisions is likely to be 
costly to small developing countries that exercise such rights, and the pressure to conform to 
stronger countries' dictates may be significant. Thus, developing countries may face collective 
action problems even where they possess a formal power to block adverse decisions. Accordingly, 
size and voting majority are not significant factors. 
There are two other key factors in the international context that affect collective action. First, 
the stability of a bloc or a coalition depends on whether or not countries within the bloc have 
similar interests. Countries in a coalition often seek to achieve different policies. Each member of 
the coalition has an interest in only some of the policies that the coalition agrees to support. 
Coalition members may also be amenable to different types of inducements or threats. Some 
countries can be bought by certain threats because of their dependency on aid, while others may be 
more interested in a bilateral free trade agreement. There will always be some uncertainty among 
coalition members as to which inducements or threats the vote-buyer has offered to other coalition 
members, and whether such inducements or threats will be sufficient to induce those countries to 
defect from the coalition. This can increase countries' fear that other countries will defect from the 
coalition, in which case they should do the same. Accordingly, the more divergent the interests of 
coalition members, the more difficult it is for them to act collectively and the easier it is for vote-
buyers to induce them to leave the coalition.  
A second critical factor in countries' ability to act together is the relative costs of exit for the 
vote-buyer as compared to the costs of exit for the vote-sellers. Exiting the institution can take the 
form of either withdrawing membership or taking action (short of direct coercion) that would have 
the effect of undermining the institution's effectiveness or influence. For example, instead of 
reaching an agreement within the WTO, the putative vote-buyer can enter into bilateral trade 
negotiations. Exit options make it difficult for vote-sellers to act collectively when the costs of exit 
for putative vote-buyers, normally the superpowers, are less than the costs of exit for putative 
vote-sellers, normally developing countries. The costs of exit are higher for developing countries 
than for developed ones when the former are dependent on the relevant institution’s decisions or 
because the institution itself is dependent on the participation and support of powerful vote-
buyers. In these circumstances, there is an implicit threat that vote-buyers will exit the institution 
if they cannot obtain favorable decisions. If powerful vote-buyers decide to exit the institution, the 
costs are borne primarily by other less powerful countries. 
(3) Competition: Competition among vote-buyers for votes can drive up the prices of votes to 
a level that reflects their fair value.25 Competition would require vote-buyers to offer prices that 
are closer to the fair value of the votes in order to win the vote. Competition for votes in 
international institutions is constrained by the fact that many developing countries are too poor to 
buy votes. There will often be only one vote-buyer or one group of vote-buyers that buys votes for 
a specific policy, especially if developed countries adopt the same stance and seek to buy the votes 
of many developing countries with conflicting interests. Competition may develop, though, where 
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 I note, though, that a qualified majority rule can also make it easier for putative vote-buyers to prevent unfavorable 
decisions from being adopted.  
25
 Levmore, supra note 12, at 135-139. 
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the superpowers have opposing views and compete with each other for other countries' votes.  
 
ii) Is coercive tendering undesirable?  
Whether or not coercive tendering is inefficient and/or unfair depends on the price that vote-sellers 
receive for their votes. Coercive tendering will tend to be inefficient and unfair when this price is 
below the fair value of the vote. Voter-sellers suffer because they are transferring their rights for 
less than their worth. Other voters whose votes were not necessary to pass the decision suffer 
because they lose the vote. However, coercive tendering will be inefficient only if the costs to such 
voters outweigh the benefits to the vote-buyers and other countries that incidentally benefit from 
the decision facilitated by the vote-trading. Where the coercive tendering is directed by one or few 
wealthy vote-buyers towards many poorer countries, it may be reasonable to conclude that the 
costs to poor nations outweigh the benefits to vote-buyers. Nonetheless, even if coercive tendering 
cannot unequivocally be found to be inefficient, it can be objectionable on distributional grounds. 
When the prices of votes are unfair, coercive tendering has the effect of distributing resources 
from poor countries to wealthy vote-buyers. Such undesirable distributional consequences can in 
themselves provide good grounds for restraining vote-trading. 
On the other hand, coercive tendering can be efficient and distributionally fair. Putative vote-
sellers will not necessarily demand a price that reflects the fair value of their votes, but may seek 
to obtain higher prices. Countries may hold out for excessive prices, especially if their consent is 
required to effect a decision. Such holdouts are inefficient because they can delay or prevent 
welfare-maximizing decisions. It would be efficient if the holdout countries were pressured into 
accepting a fair offer for their votes by using a strategy of coercive tendering. Vote-buyers can use 
inducements and threats to create the belief in the holdout voters that a certain decision is 
imminent and therefore holding out would not be an effective strategy. The effect of such coercive 
tendering would be to split the holdout coalition by reducing the prices of votes to their fair value, 
and thereby facilitate efficient decisions. 
Accordingly, we need to distinguish between cases where the coercive tendering imposes costs 
on vote-sellers and cases where coercive tendering constrains holdouts. This ultimately depends 
on whether the price vote-sellers receive for their vote is fair or excessive. This distinction raises a 
methodological problem. The assessment of the fairness of the price of a vote depends on a 
comparison of the value that countries would sincerely attach to the benefits that would accrue to 
them from favorable decisions as compared to the value of specific side-payments. For such a 
comparison to be accurate we need to monetize the values of decisions and side-payments (that 
often will be non-monetary). There is no scientific or systematic method to monetize these values, 
and the comparison will inevitably be based on political, social and economic opinions of what the 
vote-sellers have gained or lost in the decision-making process. Such opinions will often be widely 
divergent, and therefore the effects of coercive tendering can be subject to conflicting views.  
 
(b) Judgment-decisions:  
Coercive tendering practices can in principle take place in judgment-decisions as well, though 
their effect will be different. Under the circumstances explained above, it can be rational for vote-
sellers to sell their votes if they believe that a certain judgment-decision will be adopted even if 
they vote against it. The effect of coercive tendering would be to make it easier and cheaper for 
the vote-buyer to pass decisions. But, even if coercive tendering plays some part in facilitating a 
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judgment-decision, the key policy issue remains the effect of that decision on the collective good, 
irrespective of whether or not it is easy or difficult for the vote-buyer to purchase votes and of the 
price transferred from the vote-buyer to the vote-sellers.26 It is also noteworthy that with the 
possible exception of one seemingly isolated case,27 it is very difficult to find cases where coercive 
tendering facilitates bad-decisions, and as the cases discussed below suggest, vote-buyers usually 
pay valuable consideration for votes on judgment-decisions.28 Accordingly, I do not discuss 
coercive tendering in judgment-decisions.  
 
3. Agency Costs (Constituents) 
(a) Preference-decisions:  
In preference-decisions, the question is whether the vote-trading leads governments to accept 
decisions that reduce or increase the wellbeing of their constituents. A government can enter both 
vote-buying and logrolling deals in order to maximize the benefits of its constituents, either by 
gaining a vote on a policy that would benefit them or by receiving a valuable payment for the vote 
that the government utilizes for their benefit. 
The potential problem is that vote-trading can give a special incentive for governments to 
pursue their own interests by selling votes instead of exercising those votes in the interests of their 
constituents. A government can agree to a decision that harms the interests of its constituents in 
return for a cash payment that it can utilize for its own benefit. However, similar to agency costs 
(collective good) in judgment-decisions, agency costs are already inherent in many preference-
decisions because governments, especially in countries with weak accountability mechanisms, 
may also use voting rights to maximize their own interests at the expense of their constituents' 
interests. The question, then, is whether vote-trading exacerbates such agency costs. Agency costs 
are exacerbated when but for the vote-trading a country would vote for a decision that better 
maximizes the interests of its constituents than the overall outcome (including the decision 
obtained and the payment received) facilitated by the vote-trading. Vote-trading will have this 
effect when the option of selling the vote gave the government the incentive and option to sacrifice 
its constituent’s interests in order to further its own. This risk is particularly pertinent in vote-
buying deals and external-logrolling, where the consideration is a vote on an IMF or World Bank 
loan. In such transactions the consideration for the vote is a financial benefit that the government 
can disburse among the governing elite.29 Payments made to a small ruling elite are also likely to 
be cheaper for vote-buyers than votes on major policy decisions. 
On the other hand, vote-trading can actually ameliorate agency costs, where but for the vote-
trading the government would have voted for a policy that maximizes its own narrow interests, or 
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 The payment transferred to vote-sellers is merely a distribution of wealth.  
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 There is evidence that the US used coercive tendering practices to buy votes in the GA in order to pass a decision 
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the interests of an affiliated elite, at the expense of the interests of its constituents as a whole. The 
consideration for the vote can give incentives to the government to vote for a policy that better 
maximizes the interests of its constituents. The government of the vote-buyer is interested in 
maximizing the interests of its own constituents, but the policies it pursues incidentally benefit the 
constituents of the vote-seller as well. Thus vote-trading mitigates agency costs when a 
government pays another government to vote for a policy that maximizes the welfare of the 
constituents of both governments, even if the government buying the votes is probably not 
interested in the wellbeing of the constituents of the government selling the votes. 
As in the other contexts discussed above, the analysis of agency costs is subject to 
methodological difficulties. First, the analysis requires an evaluation of which decisions would 
best maximize the interests of vote-sellers' constituents. Whether or not the decisions of 
international institutions benefit the people of vote-sellers can be subject to divergent opinions. 
Second, estimating governments' actions and their effects on their constituents if not for the vote-
trading inevitably involves some speculation and uncertainty. Third, when a decision facilitated by 
vote-trading is not in the interests of vote-sellers' constituents, we need to examine whether the 
price for the votes adequately compensated these vote-sellers' constituents. Given there is no 
precise way of quantifying the values of specific policies or side-payments to specific constituents, 
it is very difficult to compare the value of votes to the value of side-payments. It is also extremely 
difficult to collate evidence on whether vote-sellers use the consideration for their votes for the 
benefit of their constituents or for the benefit of the governing elites.  
 
(b) Judgment-decisions:  
In judgment-decisions, by definition, there is no risk of agency costs (constituents) because 
governments are not expected to maximize the interests of their constituents, but only the interests 
of the international community.  
 
3. Application of the Analytical Framework to Specific Case-Studies 
In this part I apply the analytical framework to vote-trading in four institutions: the SC, the GA, 
the WTO and the IWC. Each of the following sections discusses a different institution, first by 
describing reported cases of vote-trading, second by classifying the decisions of each institution as 
judgment-decisions or preference-decisions, and third by analyzing the effects of vote-trading in 
the relevant institution by reference to the reported cases. The analysis of the effects of vote-
trading examines the applicable contexts in which certain benefits and costs may arise. In 
judgment-decisions, I discuss agency costs (collective good). In preference-decisions, I discuss 
coercive tendering and agency costs (constituents). 
Before embarking on the analysis, one caveat should be made. Although there is ample 
evidence of vote-trading, the extent of the phenomenon is not entirely clear. It is possible that 
there are other unreported cases of vote-trading, and therefore the sample of cases is subject to a 
selection bias. Other borderline practices are difficult to categorize as vote-trading. For example, 
we do not know precisely to what extent countries shape their voting in accordance with potential 
threats of withholding certain benefits by other countries, and it may be difficult to verify the 
causal connection between vote-trading agreements and the outcome of votes. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, I limit the discussion to reported cases, bearing in mind that the evidence 
may be partial and requires careful evaluation.  
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A. The Security Council 
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading 
There is both specific and statistical evidence of vote-trading in the SC.30 The discussion in this 
section focuses on specific cases in order to identify the effects of vote-trading on specific 
decisions. The first case concerns Resolution 678, which authorized the deployment of armed 
forces against Iraq in the First Gulf War in 1991.31 In exchange for support for the resolution or 
abstention, the US made the following promises: a promise of financial aid to Colombia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia and Zaire; a promise to the USSR to keep Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania out of 
the November 1990 Paris Summit conference and to persuade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to provide 
it with hard currency to make overdue payments to its commercial creditors; a promise to China to 
lift trade sanctions in place since the Tienanmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protesters and 
to provide support for a World Bank loan of $114.3 million, and the resumption of normal 
diplomatic intercourse between the two countries. By contrast, the US cut off its $70 million 
annual aid to Yemen because of its opposition to the resolution.32 
In the prelude to the Second Gulf War, the US had less success in its vote-trading attempts. One 
report suggests that US aid, financial assistance and leverage played a role in securing Resolution 
1441,33 which called on Iraq to disarm from its weapons of mass destruction and set up an 
enhanced inspection regime to supervise the disarmament.34 The main story, though, concerns the 
US failure to pass a resolution authorizing the use of armed force. There is evidence that 
throughout the negotiations the US attempted to buy the votes of non-permanent members – either 
by promising rewards or by hints of punishment.35 The main targets of US solicitation were 
countries that had not decided how to vote, namely: Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, Pakistan, Chile 
and Mexico. Despite the leverage of the US over these countries and the economic inducements 
offered (especially, better trade terms and foreign aid),36 they maintained their objection to the 
resolution.  
Likewise, Malone tells the story of Resolution 94037 on the restoration of the democratically 
elected government in Haiti and the ousting of the military regime.38 The US and France were 
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85 AJIL (1991) 516, at 523-524; Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and 
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 Anderson, Bennis, & Cavanagh, ‘Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced?’, Institute for Policy 
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interested in military intervention. Russia and China objected. China has generally been averse to 
policies that infringe on state sovereignty, including peacekeeping missions.39 Russia has 
generally adopted an anti-Western foreign policy, under which it tends to object to US-led 
operations and seeks to weaken SC intervention.40 There are very strong indications that the US 
promised Russia to support Resolution 937 concerning the UN peacekeeping operations in 
Georgia, which gave formal status to Russia's peacekeeping force in Georgia, the CIS.41 The US 
facilitated World Bank loans to China by abstaining in the vote on those loans and also gave China 
security guarantees related to various concessions in relation to Taiwan. In return, Russia and 
China withdrew their opposition to the resolution and abstained.  
 
2. Category of Decision  
SC decisions are judgment-decisions. Countries are expected to vote with a view to maximizing 
the collective good rather than their own preferences. Article 24(1) of the UN Charter states that 
the members of the UN '...confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.' Moreover, Article 24(2) requires the SC to 
act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. These purposes include maintaining 
international peace and security and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The SC is thus a form of public trust, under which SC members are entrusted with 
certain defined powers that they are required to exercise for the benefit of the international 
community. It is arguable that countries can take into account their interests to some extent. That 
the permanent five members ('P-5') have a veto power may suggest that they are entitled to use 
their voting powers to maximize their own interests. It can also be argued that because the SC 
seats are distributed geographically among regions,42 each country can at least take into account 
the interests of the group it “represents”. However, the better view is that countries' duty is 
towards the international community at large. The veto powers are designed to ensure that the SC 
does not usurp its powers, and there is nothing in the UN Charter to suggest that they override the 
SC's duties to maximize the collective good. Likewise, the geographical distribution of seats is 
intended to ensure that differing regions and cultures have a say in determining the collective 
good, rather than to legitimize countries' pursuit of their own interests.  
 
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading 
The question is whether or not the SC resolutions obtained via vote-trading are good-decisions or 
bad-decisions. The SC mandate and the purposes of the UN Charter serve as the initial guide to 
defining the collective good. The problem with identifying the SC mandate and the purposes of 
the UN Charter is that they have been subject to differing interpretations, especially in the context 
of the use of armed force. While the UN Charter conditions the SC's authorization of the use of 
armed force on the existence of a threat to international peace and security, the Charter has been 
interpreted expansively to allow the use of force in cases with a relatively weak international 
dimension, including: grave human rights violations and, more controversially, disruption of 
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democracy.43 Accordingly, in considering decisions' effects on the collective good, we also need 
to take account of the general consequences of each resolution, countries' reactions to each 
resolution, and empirical evaluation of public opinion.  
The SC resolutions that concern Iraq seem to have had generally wide support. The Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait clearly constituted a threat to international peace and security. The 
resolution facilitated the freeing of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, the use of force enjoyed a 
worldwide consensus, and most countries and people considered the action to be commendable.44 
Resolution 1441 was not controversial because it did not involve substantial sanctions on Iraq or 
the use of force. By contrast, before the Second Gulf War, when there was worldwide public 
opinion against military action,45 vote-trading attempts failed to facilitate the SC’s authorization. It 
is also noteworthy that alleged US threats before the Second Gulf War, unlike in the case of 
Yemen in the First Gulf War, do not appear to have materialized 46 
The operations in Haiti may appear more controversial because they involved the US using its 
military under the UN auspices within its own hemisphere. The US had a direct interest in 
preventing the flow of Haitian refugees from arriving in the US. Moreover, although the text of the 
resolution justified the intervention mainly on the basis of the humanitarian situation, the crisis 
was largely a domestic affair and the operations were aimed at changing the regime. Nonetheless, 
it appears that overall the effect of the resolution was, at least on balance, beneficial. The 
operations succeeded in ending the military regime responsible for grave human rights violations 
and facilitated the restoration of democracy. Despite initial reservations, especially by South 
American countries, the international reaction to the actions was generally positive and the people 
of Haiti welcomed the intervention.47  
Similar concerns arise in relation to Resolution 937. Russia had a direct individual interest in 
increasing its influence within its hemisphere and was implicitly supporting the Abkhaz that 
resisted Georgian sovereignty. Despite these concerns, the cooperation of the Russian CIS forces 
with the UN forces in Georgia appears to have helped in maintaining stability. The costs, if any, to 
people in Georgia who resisted Russia’s intervention were probably inevitable given that Russia 
was already involved in the area. Moreover, the subjection of Russia to some UN supervision 
actually ameliorated these costs and promoted international norms, albeit imperfectly.48  
Accordingly, it appears that the results of vote-trading were generally positive. But, in order to 
assess the effects of vote-trading we further need to compare these results with the likely outcomes 
but for the vote-trading. One option is that the crises in Iraq and Haiti would have been left 
without a remedy. In light of the positive effects of the resolutions, no action would clearly be an 
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inferior result. Another option is that of unilateral intervention without SC approval. The US's 
unilateral interventions both in Panama in 1989 and in Iraq in 2003 suggest that if Resolutions 648 
and 940 had not been adopted the US would have intervened unilaterally both in Iraq in 1991 and 
in Haiti in 1994. Similarly, there is little doubt that Russia would have intervened in Georgia, 
given that Resolution 937 was essentially an ex post recognition of the CIS operations. 
Accordingly, it seems that the main effect of vote-trading on the basis of the above reported cases 
is to facilitate collective action in circumstances that merit intervention, where the vote-buyer 
would otherwise pursue unilateral action.  
An exhaustive comparison of the merits of collective action versus unilateral action is outside 
the scope of this paper, but there are reasons to argue that collective action is preferable. 
Collective action promotes accountability of the relevant operation to the UN and subjects it to 
more stringent norms. Resolutions 678 and 937 included reporting requirements to the SC, and 
Resolutions 937 and 940 deployed UN observers to monitor the activities of national forces. While 
these accountability measures have not been optimal or sufficient,49 accountability has been better 
than in unilateral interventions. Additionally, there is some scope for arguing that collective action 
is more effective than unilateral action in remedying threats to international peace and security. 
The US-led operations in Panama and Iraq in 2003 were significantly less successful than the 
interventions in Haiti and Iraq in 1991.50 There is also evidence that countries and the global 
public tend to support multilateral operations and oppose unilateral ones.51 
In summary, there are several reasons to believe that vote-trading in the SC generates good-
decisions by facilitating collective action under the UN auspices. On this view, the US acts as a 
'benevolent vote-buyer' that buys the votes of countries that would otherwise cast their votes for 
outcomes that would fail to maximize collective welfare. Countries such as China and Russia have 
traditionally objected to international intervention in countries’ affairs.52 These countries can block 
good-decisions relatively easily by exercising their veto power to maximize their interests against 
international intervention. Similarly, the logrolling between the US and Russia involving 
Resolutions 940 and 937 may be categorized as an efficient logrolling compromise. In order to 
make way for two decisions that would promote the collective good, i.e. the subjection of regional 
forces to UN supervision, Russia and the US agreed to concede their individual interests in having 
unrestricted freedom of action within their respective regions. Each country conditioned its 
agreement to UN supervision within its region on the other agreeing to the same 
Moreover, the consequences of vote-trading, especially in relation to Iraq, suggest that it is 
unlikely that vote-trading would enable SC members to pass resolutions that are plainly offensive 
to the collective good. Two main factors lie behind this assertion. The primary factor is countries' 
preferences. The vote-buyer, normally the US, tends to have good-preferences supported by both 
altruism and self-interest. While the US is unlikely to buy votes if its interests are not at stake, it is 
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concerned with promoting peace, security and human rights and will normally justify its actions 
by reference to these objectives. In addition, the US's interests are often congruent with policies 
that maximize the collective good. For example, the US had individual interests in releasing 
Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation. Moreover, the preferences of vote-sellers seem to operate as a 
constraint on the vote-buyer's ability to buy votes for bad-decisions. While many small countries 
often form bad-preferences or have little interest in SC decisions, altruism may become an 
important factor, especially when one vote-buyer seeks to execute a bad-decision for its own 
benefit. Where concern for the collective good militates heavily against voting with the US, the 
price countries attach to their vote is high. In the Second Gulf War, poor countries, such as Guinea 
and Cameroon, did not respond to US solicitations. In fact, countries seemingly refused to support 
the resolution partly because they perceived the action as essentially serving American interests at 
the expense of the collective good. Likewise, many countries have an individual interest in curbing 
the US’s ability to pursue SC resolutions, especially when the US pursues bad-decisions. Many 
countries had direct or indirect individual interests - including economic, political and ideological 
interests - against the use of force in Iraq in 2003.53  
The second factor is information on vote-trading deals. It seems that widespread international 
public opinion and reputational costs can reduce the likelihood of bad-decisions facilitated by 
vote-trading. Before the Second Gulf War, there were ample, albeit sporadic, critical reports on the 
inducements and pressures employed by the US to reach a resolution. It is likely that public 
opinion objecting to the war put some pressure on countries or made it easier for them to resist the 
threats and inducements to vote with the US. Additionally, it is possible that at least partly because 
of the consensus on the need to free Kuwait, there was less criticism of the vote-trading before the 
First Gulf War, and the reputational costs to vote-traders were therefore much less significant.  
 
B. The General Assembly 
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading 
The effect of vote-trading in the GA seems to vary with the type and importance of the decision at 
stake. The GA has the power to make nonbinding decisions, such as recommendations on issues 
relating to international peace and security, and certain binding decisions. With regard to 
nonbinding decisions, there is statistical evidence that aid and multilateral loans can buy votes in 
the GA.54 The effect of such vote-trading on global welfare, however, is probably limited because 
of the nonbinding nature of the resolutions and their relative ineffectiveness in regulating states’ 
behavior.55 The discussion therefore focuses on binding decisions, where the effect of vote-trading 
is potentially stronger and there is more specific evidence of vote-trading deals. I focus on election 
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decisions in the GA, where vote-trading among countries is consistently the norm. 
The evidence relates in particular to election of nonpermanent members of the SC and election 
of judges to the ICJ.56 Malone describes the ample trade of votes among states in elections to the 
SC, and provides valuable insights on this practice.57 First, countries often trade votes for votes in 
elections to other organizations. Because of the SC’s importance, votes in elections to the SC are 
usually exchanged for several votes in other elections. The votes of certain countries are worth 
more than the votes of others because of their active or passive influence over other countries’ 
votes. Second, there is also evidence of vote-buying. Most commonly, there are allegations of aid 
being conditioned on votes and financial favors provided to officials of other countries. For 
example, the election of Japan in 1996 by a large majority was allegedly facilitated by its aid 
program and favors to officials.58 Third, vote-trading involves virtually all countries. Malone 
claims that the P-5 do not trade openly but there may be exchanges of votes for ‘badly needed 
favors’ or in recognition of diplomatic friendship. However, it appears that when the US has 
strong views on the elections, it uses its full leverage (including vote-trading) to influence votes. 
Thus there are reports that the US intervened to prevent the election of Sudan to the SC in 2000,59 
and more recently the election of Venezuela.60 It is noteworthy, though, that small countries 
(including Sudan and Venezuela) buy votes as well, especially by paying directly to delegates. 
Fourth, the strongest country does not necessarily win. Less powerful members can court small 
countries and win the elections. Every vote counts and elections can be decided by a small number 
of votes.  
As in elections to the SC, there is strong, albeit general, evidence of vote-trading among 
countries in elections to the ICJ. Government representatives, candidates and even judges report 
that vote-trading rather than impartial evaluation of qualifications is an important determinant of 
international judicial elections.61 Most commonly, states engage in logrolling. States agree to 
support the candidate of another state in return for support for their own candidates, often in 
elections to other positions in international institutions. As stated by Rosenne: ‘…there is little 
doubt that at times a delegation is instructed to vote for a given candidate in return for promises of 
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support on another matter of close concern to it, whether its own candidature in another election or 
a matter of substantive concern.’62 
 
2. Category of Decision 
Elections to the SC and the ICJ are judgment-decisions. Article 23(1) of the UN Charter expressly 
requires that in elections to the SC due regard be paid primarily to the contribution of countries to 
the maintenance of peace and security and the purposes of the UN Charter. Countries are expected 
to elect members with the greatest commitment to international peace and security. Likewise, 
Article 2 of the Statute of the ICJ states: ‘The Court shall be composed of a body of independent 
judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who 
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices, or are juriconsults of recognized competence in international law.’ Countries are 
required to choose the judges with the highest qualifications and moral integrity. It is noteworthy 
in this respect that both in the SC and the ICJ, seats are distributed among specific regions.63 This 
arguably suggests that countries should elect the candidates that would best represent their 
interests or the interests of their region. The prevailing view, however, is that the most qualified 
candidates should be elected, and that geographical distribution is a secondary consideration both 
in SC elections64 and ICJ elections.65  
 
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading 
Whether vote-trading facilitates bad-decisions or good-decisions depends on whether vote-trading 
leads to the election of more qualified or less qualified candidates than those that would be elected 
but for the vote-trading. 
The first place to start is to ask whether the quality of elected candidates is satisfactory. In the 
case of the SC, as Malone argues, not infrequently countries with weak reputations for promoting 
international peace win election to the SC at the expense of countries that have consistently 
displayed a commitment to such ideals. The election of Syria to the SC in 2001, a country alleged 
to be involved in sponsoring terror organizations, is one obvious example. Apart from legitimate 
reasons, such as gaining international prestige or pursuing broader objectives, countries seek a SC 
seat in order to advance their positions when the SC considers decisions that affect their 
interests.66 Another reason may even be to attract financial aid from other countries that seek to 
buy their votes.67 In the case of the ICJ, the picture is more equivocal. On the one hand, some take 
the view that the professional qualifications of ICJ judges are very high.68 Nomination procedures 
in many countries are usually designed to provide some assurance that ICJ judges are duly 
qualified.69 On the other hand, others take a different view. Reisman has argued that UN election 
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systems sometimes produce 'undistinguished candidates or mediocrities.'70 There is even a claim 
concerning judicial misconduct to favor specific parties.71 A recent study provides empirical 
evidence that decisions of individual judges are biased, first in favor of their country of origin, but 
also to varying extents in favor of countries that match the economic, political and cultural 
attributes of their own.72 There is a suspicion that candidates may be expected to maintain loyalty 
to their countries’ interests.  
But even if the quality of elected candidates is unsatisfactory, we still need to establish that 
vote-trading materially contributes to this result. Malone's account seems to suggest that vote-
trading is one among several elements in the election process that weakens the requirement that 
SC members show commitment to international peace and security. In the context of ICJ elections, 
Gross argued that certain qualified candidates were not elected because their countries did not 
belong to any vote-trading bloc in the UN,73 and the practice of vote-trading has been heavily 
criticized by NGOs as reducing the quality of elections.74 On this view, without vote-trading, 
countries would tend to elect better candidates. This view is plausible if we believe that countries 
have good-preferences because of individual interests or altruistic preferences. Vote-buyers will 
normally be countries that buy votes for their own candidacy or candidates. Such vote-buyers buy 
votes of countries that would otherwise vote for other better candidates, and there is naturally a 
chance that these vote-buyers will win.75 One example may be Japan's landslide win over India in 
1996, despite Japan’s unimpressive record of participation in peace maintenance activities.76 It is 
noteworthy that because voting is by secret ballot, there is little information on which counties 
actually trade votes, and therefore countries do not suffer reputational costs for vote-trading that 
facilitates bad-decisions.  
On the other hand, a second opinion holds that vote-trading generates positive results. On this 
view, the required majority often has bad-preferences, and there is a need for a benevolent vote-
buyer to buy votes to secure the election of better candidates. For example, in the case of elections 
to the SC, the US used its leverage (including vote-trading) in order to prevent the election in 2000 
of Sudan, a country accused of gross human rights violations, and, more recently, of Venezuela, a 
country with a doubtful commitment to maintaining peace and security. In the case of elections to 
the ICJ, there are no specific examples, but one account suggests that influential countries buy 
votes to ensure the quality of elected judges. Rosenne argues that diplomatic contacts 
(presumably, including vote-trading) prior to the elections enable influential governments to 
indicate their views of candidates’ qualifications, and that such contacts help in ensuring that 
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candidates measure up to the required standard.77  
That vote-trading is beneficial is far from being the conclusive view. Vote-trading is also 
utilized by unethical countries that aim to promote less qualified candidates. Poor countries can 
afford the price of votes, given that countries often pay with votes in other international elections 
and the payments are often directed towards individuals that can be bought more cheaply. Syria, a 
country on the US's list of terrorism sponsors, was elected to the SC in 2001 despite the US's 
strong opposition, although the extent to which either Syria or the US were involved in vote-
trading is unclear.78 Moreover, even where the US actively bought votes for good-decisions, it is 
not clear what the result would have been if not for the vote-trading, because other countries also 
buy votes. Both Sudan in 2000 and Venezuela in 2006 engaged in vote-trading as well, so 
arguably they would have lost anyway if all countries avoided the practice of vote-trading.  
In summary, it is difficult to conclude whether or not vote-trading leads to good-decisions or 
bad-decisions, and in some cases it may have no effect on the outcome. More information about 
specific vote-trading deals is necessary in order to assess their effect. The interesting question 
remains whether but for the option of making individual gains countries would tend to vote for 
more or less qualified candidates.  
 
C. The World Trade Organization  
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading 
Vote-trading is the norm in WTO negotiations. The essence of the WTO decision-making process 
involves vote-trading, in the sense that countries agree to support one policy in return for another 
country's agreement to support another policy. Vote-trading can take place between two opposing 
negotiating blocs. Vote-trading can also be intra-bloc. The essence of many coalitions within the 
WTO is internal-logrolling agreements under which each country agrees to support a list of 
negotiating objectives, only some of which are of interest to it.  
More controversially, there is evidence of vote-trading coupled with coercive tactics employed 
by developed countries, especially the US and EC countries. Such practices take place in informal 
meetings before and during WTO ministerial conferences and they are aimed at breaking down 
coalitions of developing countries. The main focus of such attempts in the Doha Round in 2001 
was the Like Minded Group (LMG), a group of 14 developing countries, which sought to promote 
implementation issues, development issues and procedural reform, and objected to negotiations 
over the Singapore issues.79 Jawara & Kwa and Narlikar & Odell provide many examples of 
carrots, sticks and logrolling allegedly used to induce countries to defect from the LMG.80 Threats 
included withholding preferential trade agreements and concessions and blocking the availability 
of IMF loans. More concrete side-payments included the following: The US granted South Africa 
$9 million in technical assistance and $9.2 million assistance under AGOA; Tanzania was granted 
$3 billion in debt relief under the HIPC initiative and the ACP waiver; Jamaica received an aid 
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package from the IMF and the ACP waiver; Kenya received the ACP waiver and technical 
assistance; Japan signed a bilateral investment agreement with Indonesia on condition that 
Indonesia endorse the talks about investment in Doha. Other countries received trivial promises: 
Malaysia received unenforceable promises regarding non-agricultural market access; Mauritius 
got an unbinding promise of a study program specific to small and vulnerable countries. The LMG 
eventually fragmented without achieving its objectives. Its members agreed to negotiate over the 
Singapore issues in future rounds in return for a general commitment to development issues.  
The ministerial in Cancun took a different turn. A new group, the G-20, emerged, led by Brazil, 
China and India. The G-20 demanded that developed countries undertake nonreciprocal measures 
to eliminate trade restrictions, including radical cuts in domestic support measures provided by 
developed countries, duty-free access for tropical and other agricultural products, and the 
elimination of export subsidies for certain products. The G-20 strongly resisted the joint US and 
EC agricultural policy and the Singapore issues. As in Doha, developed countries tried to split the 
G-20. The US, for example, offered inducements in the form of tariff quotas to certain Central 
American countries and threatened to slow down regional integration. But the G-20 held together 
firmly in Cancun, and no agreements were concluded.81  
Specific evidence of vote-buying or external-logrolling in the ministerial in Hong Kong in 2005 
is scarce, although there are reports of 'divide and conquer' tactics employed by developed 
countries (possibly, including vote-trading) in order to split the G-20.82 The end result appears to 
have been decided in closed-door negotiations between the US and the EC, on one side, and Brazil 
and India, on the other. Although some members, such as South Africa and Venezuela, expressed 
their opposition to it, all countries voted for a common deal, which included the following: in 
agriculture, a commitment to eliminate export subsidies by 2013, and a three-tier approach to 
reducing domestic subsidies; a commitment to ensure market access in services within four bands; 
reduction of tariffs on NAMA would be conducted in accordance with the Swiss Formula; and aid 
in the form of IMF and World Banks loans would be provided to developing countries.83 
 
2. Category of Decision 
The decisions of the WTO, which concern trade rules, are preference-decisions. Countries are 
expected to pursue their individual interests in order to effect welfare-maximizing decisions for 
the benefit of their own constituents, irrespective of their effect on other countries and the 
international community. It has been argued that WTO decisions should be based on principles of 
equity and fairness,84 in the sense that countries should take into account the interests of other - 
especially poor - countries and the international community. The development agenda of the WTO 
suggests that WTO negotiations should address the distributional concerns of poor countries.85 
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Nonetheless, in its current form the WTO decision-making process does not allow for 
distributional concerns to be addressed other than via the negotiations process.86 Developing 
countries are thus required to make reciprocal concessions for any benefit provided by developed 
countries, and developed countries have no obligation to make unilateral concessions in favor of 
poorer countries. 
 
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading 
In preference-decisions, vote-trading is prima facie efficient. Vote-trading, especially internal-
logrolling, is necessary for the effectiveness of the WTO decision-making process, which 
'...inevitably involves quid pro quo and sometimes tit-for-tat.’87 The WTO voting system is based 
on consensus and each country has, at least formally, a veto power.88 It would be virtually 
impossible to reach decisions by consensus without reciprocal tradeoffs. These tradeoffs are 
essentially based on internal-logrolling agreements, under which countries exchange their 
positions over different trade policies. Vote-buying and external-logrolling can also facilitate 
consensus. One example is where two opposing coalitions cannot reach an agreement, but wish to 
break the deadlock by making payments other than trade concessions. Similarly, where a 
developed countries’ coalition reaches agreements over trade rules with the larger developing 
countries, leaving smaller countries little to gain, for example, because they have no exports of the 
relevant products, it may be efficient to allow side-payments to these smaller countries in order to 
facilitate consensus. The concern, however, is the extent to which vote-trading may involve 
inefficient coercive tendering and exacerbate agency costs (constituents).  
 
(a) Coercive Tendering:  
I first discuss the elements of coercive tendering, and then consider whether or not such coercive 
tendering is undesirable.  
 
i) Elements of coercive tendering:  
(1) Pressure to tender: That there is a pressure to tender in the WTO is clearly indicated by 
the presence of inducements and threats. Developing countries often labor under the fear that they 
will end up losing in the negotiation process. Therefore, it may be rational for them to accept side-
payments even if less valuable than the concessions they demanded in the negotiations.  
(2) Collective action problems: The ability of developing countries to bargain for better 
outcomes depends on collective action. While each country in the WTO formally has a veto power 
to stop trade deals and demand better value for its vote, the realities of power politics in the WTO 
are different. A draft of packaged agreements is usually agreed on in informal meetings, often 
without the participation of the smaller developing countries. The draft is presented at a formal 
meeting and is usually accepted with only minor amendments. When one country opposes such a 
packaged deal, it is likely to come under pressure from other countries. Particularly small 
developing countries may be unable to actively object to other countries’ dictates because such 
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objection may be followed by a sanction, such as the withdrawal of aid.89 
Two main factors need to be examined to assess developing countries' ability to act 
collectively: the heterogeneity of coalition members' interests and the relative costs of exit for 
vote-buyers. First, the interests of members of developing countries' coalitions are not only not 
homogeneous, but often conflicting as well. Brazil and Argentina seek agricultural liberalization, 
whereas India has a protectionist policy on market access.90 The smaller developing countries are 
focused on development and capacity issues, but even their interests are divergent and depend on 
their specific comparative advantages.91 As explained above, the differences in interests of 
developing countries make their coalitions less stable and more vulnerable to inducements and 
threats. The experience of trade coalitions in the WTO as well as the GATT indicates that without 
internal coherence and shared commercial interests, a coalition is unlikely to succeed, especially 
when the US and EC stand together.92 Second, the costs of exit for developed countries are 
significantly lesser than the costs of exit for developing countries. The US and EC are less 
dependent on the benefits of multilateral agreements than developing countries because the costs 
of losing a volume of exports are less likely to have a substantial effect on their economies.93 In 
addition, the US and the EC can always seek bilateral or regional trade agreements because there 
are always countries that would like to have more access to their markets. Developing countries 
also have less bargaining leverage when negotiating bilaterally with the powerful countries, and 
they are likely to gain less in bilateral deals than in multilateral deals.94 
The relatively low costs of exit for developed countries and the conflicting interests of 
developing countries create collective action problems, and together with the pressure on 
developing countries to tender their votes create the perception in developing countries that their 
demands will not be met in the negotiations. When countries begin to defect from a coalition by 
selling their votes, the coalition loses its credibility and ability to block adverse decisions, and 
other countries, fearful of being left with no gains, are likely to follow suit.95 The collapse of the 
LMG in Doha and, to some extent, the G-20 in Hong Kong points to this pattern. The more 
countries defected from the LMG, the more the coalition's value diminished, which in turn 
prompted more defections, until India remained alone with no realistic power to object to the final 
agreement.96 The G-20 has shown resilience in Cancun, but the result of Hong Kong suggests that 
deals can be concluded largely by appeasing the larger members of the G-20, Brazil and India, and 
leaving other countries dissatisfied. While such deals between developed countries and the larger 
developing countries are not always feasible, there are reasons to question whether developing 
countries would be consistently capable of acting collectively against coercive tendering practices. 
(3) Competition: The main parties that buy votes, other than via internal-logrolling, are the US 
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and the EC, and both tend to agree on a common position either before or during ministerial 
conferences. Developing countries, even the large ones, do not offer similar inducements to other 
developing countries to prevent defections from their coalitions, simply because they cannot 
afford to make side-payments.97 Accordingly, there is no meaningful competition among vote-
buyers in the WTO. 
 
ii) Is coercive tendering undesirable?  
Coercive tendering may be undesirable on the grounds of efficiency and unfair distribution, but 
only if we can show that the inducements paid to specific countries and/or the value they have 
extracted from WTO decisions are less than the fair value of their votes. Thus we need to assess 
whether or not developing countries ended up losing from WTO packaged agreements. 
Commentators' views on this issue are widely divergent.  
There is a body of opinion that developing countries tend to concede more in WTO 
negotiations than they receive. In relation to the Doha ministerial, it was argued that LMG 
countries were worse off after the conference than before it.98 Perhaps the only meaningful gain to 
the LMG, a general commitment to development issues and promises to bolster technical 
assistance, was described as essentially verbal and did not mandate any operative effect.99 Similar 
arguments have been made in the context of Hong Kong.100 On this view, the agricultural 
concessions are minimal (especially the EC repackaged reforms that the EU was supposed to 
undertake anyway); aid for trade is a weak commitment to development (and possibly repackaging 
of IMF and World Bank loans as concessions); commitment to liberalization of services is harmful 
to many developing countries, and so is the Swiss formula in respect of NAMA. However, even if 
we adopt this view, we still need to show that the value of side-payments for agreeing to these 
decisions did not adequately compensate the vote-sellers. Some of the payments reported above, 
especially the nonbinding promises to impoverished countries, do seem to be negligible and 
certain inducements offered to developing countries, such as the ACP waiver, were found later to 
have limited value.101 On the other hand, it is not clear how to compare the side-payments given to 
developing countries with the benefits they sincerely expected to obtain, especially as some 
countries did not concede much in the negotiations anyway.102 Moreover, some countries did 
receive a sizable aid package or a loan, and they have probably not lost in this process. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the extent to which developing countries as a group suffered 
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from the overall outcomes, if at all.  
The other view is that WTO ministerial conferences have generally yielded fair and efficient 
results.103 On this view, developing countries were able to extract fair value for their votes in the 
form of favorable decisions. Regarding the Doha ministerial, the commitment to development and 
concessions on TRIPS in exchange for an agreement to speak on the Singapore issues in future 
rounds has been viewed by many as a successful outcome. The US's and the EC's compromise on 
agriculture in Hong Kong, albeit not optimal, is equivalent to developing countries' concessions on 
services and NAMA. In this respect, the value of side-payments and threats exerted by developed 
countries are of limited importance from a welfare perspective if the end result is valuable to 
developing countries. The demands of the LMG and G-20 for unilateral concessions from 
developed countries, especially on agriculture, may be regarded as inconsistent with the WTO 
decision-making process, which is based on reciprocal concessions. Such demands may be viewed 
as holdout attempts designed to extract excessive benefits. The effect of coercive tendering 
therefore is to assist the US and EC in reducing the excessive demands of developing countries to 
a level that better reflects the fair value of their votes. Without such coercive tendering, holdouts 
could preclude or delay welfare-maximizing agreements.  
In summary, those who believe that WTO agreements were adverse to the interests of 
developing countries and that no deal would have been a better outcome in Doha and Hong Kong, 
or that developing countries could have reached better and fair results in those conferences if not 
for the coercive tendering employed by developed countries, will argue against such tendering 
practices. However, if we believe that WTO agreements promote global growth and that the slow 
progress of WTO negotiations is at least partly to blame on developing countries' insistence on 
making excessive demands, we may be willing to countenance coercive tendering which is 
designed to facilitate welfare-maximizing agreements.  
 
(b) Agency costs (constituents):  
In preference-decisions we need to examine whether vote-trading leads to decisions that harm or 
benefit the interests of countries’ constituents. The question is whether without the option of 
selling their vote, governments of developing countries would pursue policies that better maximize 
the interests of their constituents, or otherwise harm their interests. This question requires us to 
form a view regarding the effects of WTO decisions on the people of vote-sellers, essentially 
developing countries. Again, there are two main views on the effects of vote-trading, both of 
which are debatable.  
The first view is that governments of developing countries may agree to vote for policies that 
benefit developed countries in return for a consideration that benefits those governments at the 
expense of the people of developing countries. As Narlikar points out: '...ministers can be tempted 
or blackmailed with carrots and sticks such as IMF programmes, aid packages, free trade 
arrangements and so forth...ministers have smaller shadows of the future than career diplomats. As 
a result, ministers may be more willing to sign on to agreements for short-term gains even if the 
agreement proves to be woefully inadequate, even harmful, in the longer run.'104 There is even a 
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suggestion that delegates or government officials courted by the US and the EC derived personal 
benefits from enhancing their relationships with powerful countries.105 This risk is pertinent in 
WTO decisions where governments are expected to negotiate over permanent trade rules for the 
long-term benefits of their constituents. Governments are less likely to face criticism for accepting 
side-payments because the effects of conceding the long-term interests may not be apparent, 
especially given the weakness of domestic accountability mechanisms in many developing 
countries and the weak public scrutiny of WTO agreements through parliamentary ratification 
procedures.106  
The problem with this view however is that we do not necessarily know that without the side-
payments governments would actually pursue policies that better benefit their constituents. Even 
without vote-trading, governments can pursue policies that benefit the governing elite and neglect 
the interests of their constituents at large. Moreover, we do not necessarily know that the short-
term benefits will be less valuable to the relevant constituents as compared with the policies that 
the relevant government would have pursued without vote-trading. While some of the side-
payments mentioned above seem to be negligible, other benefits are more valuable; for example, if 
a poor country receives a valuable loan, the overall result may be in the interests of its people.  
The second view is that vote-trading ameliorates agency costs (constituents). This view asserts 
that vote-trading forces developing countries to open up their markets and abandon protectionist 
policies. On this view, the freeing of trade is in the benefit of the people of developing countries, 
because it increases welfare in the long run. Direct payments and aid can be used by developing 
countries to build their capacity to compete, but even if such payments are not utilized for the 
benefit of the relevant constituents or too small to be useful, the free trade policies promoted by 
developed countries benefit the people of all countries by increasing global growth. It is possible, 
therefore, to argue that vote-trading gives incentives to governments that protect specific national 
groups to open up their markets for the benefit of their constituents, and in this way ameliorates 
agency costs created by these governments' protectionism.  
Like the first view, this view has weaknesses. In particular, it assumes too readily that free trade 
benefits countries’ constituents. There are reasonable arguments that some protectionism would 
favor people in developing countries. There is evidence that the benefits of global growth tend to 
flow primarily to elites rather than the middle and low-income classes,107 and thus some 
protectionism may be needed to cater to the latter's interests. Protectionist policies can also be 
warranted by 'infant industry' considerations and local industries' inability to compete.  
Whichever view we adopt, it is important to emphasize that the essence of the WTO is based on 
internal-logrolling agreements under which countries exchange votes to secure policies that 
benefit their own constituents, even if governments do so in a non-optimal way. Given that the 
risk of agency costs is lower when the consideration for votes is not of financial or tangible 
benefit, there is less concern with internal-logrolling agreements that presumably generate global 
benefits and more concern with vote-buying and external-logrolling involving IMF or World Bank 
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loans. The problem with the latter transactions, though, as I explain above, is that it is not possible 
to determine conclusively whether they exacerbate or ameliorate agency costs without pre-
established convictions regarding the effects of WTO decisions on the people of developing 
countries. 
 
D. The International Whaling Commission 
1. Reported Cases of Vote-Trading 
Countries in the IWC are largely divided into three groups: the pro-whaling countries, such as 
Iceland, Norway and Japan; the anti-whalers, such as the UK, Australia, and the US; and finally, 
the group of countries that either do not care much or do not care at all about whaling issues. 
There is compelling evidence that in recent years Japan has consistently bought the votes of 
many countries belonging to the third group with a view to buying several important decisions.108 
Japan has not only paid members of the IWC, but has also paid countries to join the IWC and vote 
in accordance with Japan’s interests. The money is paid through Japan’s Overseas Development 
Assistance and usually invested in the fisheries industries of the selling countries. One report 
states that Japan invested about $160 million between 1987 and 2001 in fisheries aid to Caribbean 
countries, including St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, and Antigua & 
Barbuda.109 These countries consistently vote with Japan on virtually all proposed resolutions in 
the IWC. Other small countries that vote with Japan include Tuvalu, Benin and Guinea. There is 
also some evidence of external-logrolling. Japan trades votes in CITES CoP 11 for votes in the 
IWC with several African countries that want to restart international trade in ivory.110 For 
convenience, I refer to Japanese vote-buying and external-logrolling collectively as 'Japanese 
vote-trading'. As a result of the Japanese vote-trading, the pro-whaling bloc has grown from 9 
members in 2000 to approximately half of the members in 2006. 
It should be pointed out that in order to pass a decision on key issues, such as a determination 
of protected species, setting catch limits of whale species, the permissible intensity of whaling and 
the designation of whale sanctuaries, the IWC must amend the Schedule to the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling ('ICRW') by a three-fourths majority.111 Other 
resolutions are decided by a simple majority. 
Three main issues were subject to controversy in the IWC in recent years. First, Japan has been 
trying for several years to pass a resolution to lift the moratorium on commercial whaling effective 
since 1986, but has failed to reach the required three-fourths majority.112 In 2006, however, a 
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declaratory resolution stating that the moratorium is no longer necessary and urging the IWC to 
resume commercial whaling on a sustainable basis was passed by a simple majority.113 The second 
issue concerns proposals to establish whale sanctuaries in the South Pacific and in the South 
Atlantic. The Japanese vote-trading bloc was able to prevent these proposals from being 
accepted.114 The third issue is the design of the new compliance mechanism, namely, the Revised 
Management Scheme ('RMS'). The debate over the RMS concerns several interrelated issues, 
including the level and intensity of inspection, the utilization of DNA technology to track whale 
products, recording information pertaining to animal welfare, and the composition of the 
compliance review committee. Whaling countries argue for a less stringent compliance 
mechanism but, more fundamentally, appear to condition agreement to the RMS on the 
resumption of sustainable commercial whaling.115 
 
2. Category of Decision 
Decisions on whale regulation in the IWC are 'judgment-decisions'. Countries are expected to 
express their judgment on what should be the most appropriate measures for whale regulation in 
accordance with specified criteria. Article V of the ICRW states that ‘…amendments of the 
Schedule (a) shall be such as are necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of the 
Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the 
whale resources; (b) shall be based on scientific findings;…and (d) shall take into consideration 
the interests of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry.’ The purposes of the 
ICRW, as stated in the preamble, include: safeguarding whale stocks for future generations, 
protecting whales from over-fishing, confining whaling to the species best able to sustain 
exploitation, and ensuring proper and effective conservation.  
 
3. Analysis of Vote-Trading 
In order to assess whether vote-trading, especially the Japanese vote-trading, has facilitated good-
decisions or bad-decisions, we need to identify the collective good against which IWC decisions 
should be evaluated. The problem with identifying the collective good is that it has been subject to 
a major debate. There are two main views of the collective good in the IWC: the conservationist 
view, under which whaling should be limited to sustainable levels, and the preservationist view 
that advocates a total ban on whaling. To consider these views we first need to examine the 
provisions of the ICRW. The ICRW contemplates safeguarding whales, but also sustainable 
whaling, optimum utilization, and due regard to the interests of the whaling industry. The ICRW 
also requires that whaling restrictions be based on scientific evidence. In fact, the preamble to the 
ICRW expressly recognizes that increases in whale stocks will permit increases in the number of 
whales that can be captured. Thus the ICRW clearly lends support to the conservationist view that 
accepts whaling to the extent that the relevant species is not endangered. Proponents of the 
conservationist view point especially to the fact that since the establishment of the IWC and the 
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ban on commercial whaling, the number of whales has significantly increased. It is generally 
accepted that the ban on commercial whaling is no longer justified by scientific evidence in 
respect of certain species that are now abundant, especially the Grey Minke Whale.116  
Preservationists, on the other hand, interpret the ICRW expansively to allow moral sentiments 
towards whales to be given significant weight in IWC decisions. Whales have increasingly 
become viewed as having human attributes and killing whales is perceived by many as immoral.117 
Since the ICRW was signed in 1946, many countries, predominantly Australia, New Zealand, the 
US and the UK, have gradually adopted a strong anti-whaling stance by ceasing whaling 
operations and supporting extensive whaling restrictions. The current situation appears to be that 
without the Japanese vote-trading a substantial majority of countries in the IWC would support a 
permanent ban on all whaling, establishing more whale sanctuaries and a strict compliance regime. 
Any view as to the effects of vote-trading depends on which view of the collective good is 
adopted. Preservationists argue that Japanese vote-trading is designed to promote its own 
individual interests. Japan views whaling as part of its national cultural identity, and strong 
domestic interest groups put political pressure on the government to continue whaling.118 Japanese 
vote-trading is thus harmful because it is employed to block anti-whaling policies, such as the 
establishment of new sanctuaries and a stricter compliance mechanism. By contrast, 
conservationists would argue that Japanese vote-trading is beneficial. Countries with no whaling 
industry vote against whaling in order to appear 'greener' in the eyes of their public.119 These anti-
whaling countries vote their interests - i.e. to show commitment to environmental issues - at the 
expense of the collective good, properly defined in accordance with the ICRW to allow 
sustainable whaling. It is not implausible to argue that most people would support limited 
controlled whaling of abundant species if not for the false impression that all whales are 
endangered. While Japan’s whaling views may be partly derived from its own interests, they also 
reflect Japan’s judgment that scientific evidence supports a relaxation of anti-whaling measures.120 
Japan, on this view, is a benevolent vote-buyer that buys votes for good-decisions. 
A 'middle view' may be offered as accommodating the interests of both anti-whalers and 
whalers. On the one hand, the IWC cannot ignore moral preferences that oppose whaling, but on 
the other hand, some limited commercial whaling is justified given whalers' strong preferences. In 
many respects, it seems that the current status quo, which is partly the consequence of Japan's 
ability through vote-trading to block new anti-whaling policies, represents this middle view. The 
moratorium and existing whale sanctuaries have led to a major increase in the number of whales, 
while whaling countries continue to conduct some limited whaling under a reservation to the 
moratorium121 or, like Japan, under the scientific exception to the ICRW.122 So long as the 
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Japanese vote-trading bloc does not exceed the three-fourths majority required to overturn the 
moratorium, an unlikely scenario at present, whaling will continue to be restricted to limited 
amounts; yet, it will remain difficult for anti-whalers to introduce more expansive anti-whaling 
policies.123 Interestingly, even though the IWC decision-making seems somewhat dysfunctional, 
this status quo is actually close to the state of affairs contemplated by the ICRW.124  
The middle view of the collective good may also be accommodated with political compromises 
that are based on internal-logrolling agreements. The negotiations in recent years in the IWC 
outside the scope of the annual meetings have been based on the idea that anti-whalers will agree 
to a relaxation of the ban on commercial whaling and whaling nations will agree to establish a 
strong enforcement and compliance mechanism125 This potential future compromise can be viewed 
as an efficient logrolling compromise, under which each group of countries concedes its personal 
bad-preferences in order to achieve a package of welfare-maximizing decisions. Anti-whaling 
countries would concede their personal preference for a complete prohibition on whaling, while 
whaling countries would concede their personal preference against a strong enforcement and 
compliance mechanism, in favor of a deal to allow limited sustainable whaling and improve 
enforcement.126  
 
4. Conclusion 
When we examine the results of applying the analysis to specific institutions, we see that in most 
cases it is not possible to determine with certainty whether vote-trading is harmful or beneficial, 
and in some cases there are good reasons to believe that vote-trading maximizes welfare.  
Taking judgment-decisions first, despite the moral implications associated with such decisions, 
vote-trading can have significant beneficial effects. I have argued above that the US paid countries 
in order to induce them to agree to welfare-maximizing (albeit not optimal) decisions, in particular 
the use of force against Iraq in the First Gulf War. The decision to use force in Haiti in 1994 and 
the recognition of the CIS force in Georgia can also be regarded as good-decisions. While there is 
no guarantee that vote-trading will never be used to facilitate bad-decisions, the failure of the US's 
vote-trading attempts before the Second Gulf War shows that countries’ preferences and 
reputational costs can limit the vote-buyer’s ability to buy votes for bad-decisions. In the GA, 
there is evidence that election results facilitated through vote-trading are in many instances not 
optimal, but there is no compelling evidence that vote-trading facilitated such results. In both 
elections to the ICJ and elections to the SC, two main conflicting views can be put forward. One 
holds that vote-trading reduces the quality of elected members, the other that it actually facilitates 
the election of more qualified candidates. Both views have some evidential support, but it is 
impossible to decide conclusively which better reflects the effects of vote-trading, especially 
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because we do not know whether but for the vote-trading countries would vote for better or 
inferior candidates. In the IWC, the major problem is the uncertainty regarding which view of the 
collective good should be adopted, the conservationist or preservationist. Without a reasonably 
certain conception of the collective good, it is impossible to determine whether or not vote-trading 
is undesirable. It should be emphasized that the Japanese vote-trading strategy has been successful 
only in maintaining the status quo in the IWC, by blocking anti-whaling policies but failing to 
facilitate pro-whaling ones. This status quo is actually consistent with the middle view of the 
collective good that balances between the preservationist and conservationist views. The middle 
view is also consistent with the emerging compromise in the IWC, which is based on an internal-
logrolling deal between whaling and anti-whaling nations to relax the ban on commercial whaling 
but strengthen compliance mechanisms. 
In preference-decisions, essentially the decisions of the WTO, the results of the analysis are 
similar. It is clear that certain transactions are, at least on balance, efficient, in particular internal-
logrolling agreements that form the basis of the WTO decision-making process by facilitating 
mutual concessions on trade issues. Without such internal-logrolling it would be virtually 
impossible to achieve consensus over new WTO decisions. But the effect of other vote-trading 
transactions is subject to controversy, and ultimately depends on how we view the overall outcome 
of the WTO decision-making. While vote-trading may be viewed as part of a coercive tendering 
strategy employed by powerful nations to pressure developing countries to agree to policies they 
genuinely object to, others may contend that coercive tendering is simply a tool for preventing 
holdout countries from blocking welfare-maximizing decisions on liberalizing world trade. 
Likewise, while we may view vote-trading, especially vote-buying deals, as exacerbating agency 
costs (constituents) by allowing governments to sell votes to further their own interests at the 
expense of their constituents, vote-trading may also be viewed as ameliorating agency costs 
(constituents) if we consider WTO decisions that remove protectionist obstacles to free trade to be 
in the interests of the people of developing countries.  
In light of this analysis, it would not make sense to introduce policy measures against vote-
trading in international institutions. At least so far as the four institutions discussed in this paper 
are concerned, there is not one clear case where vote-trading has reduced global welfare, and there 
is substantial evidence that vote-trading can generate benefits. Even if we believe that vote-trading 
is costly overall, it is hard to contemplate an efficient mechanism to address its costs. Any express 
legal rule that prohibits all or some types of vote-trading would suffer from severe adjudication 
and enforcement costs, as most vote-trading deals take place behind the scenes.127 There is also a 
risk that countries that are better at hiding their vote-trading attempts will free-ride on countries 
that comply with such a rule. Moreover, to the extent that a rule against vote-trading would 
prevent powerful vote-buyers from achieving favorable decisions in a certain institution, it may 
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simply induce them to exit that institution.128 
The remaining questions in regard to vote-trading call for further research. There is a need for 
more case studies and more facts, for example: the frequency of vote-trading in the SC; whether 
better judges would be elected without vote-trading; to what extent reputation affects countries’ 
incentives to buy or sell votes; the value developing countries can expect to obtain by acting 
collectively in the WTO, etc. In addition, the analysis should be applied to more international 
institutions, such as the Codex Alimentarius and the World Health Organization, where vote-
trading presumably takes place as well. It would also be interesting to extend the analysis to other 
international organizations with non-state members, such as the International Standards 
Organization and the International Olympic Committee.129 
Finally, I note that the usefulness of vote-trading in judgment-decisions that implicate serious 
moral issues raises concerns about the practicality of the very idea of judgment-decisions made by 
states through a voting process. It may be unrealistic to expect self-interested countries with duties 
to their own constituents to vote for the collective good. In the domestic context, judgment-
decisions are made only by professionals, rather than by self-interested political actors. We may 
question whether all judgment-decisions should be transformed into preference-decisions, though 
under a system where countries have better incentives to represent broader interests than solely 
their own. The incentives for countries to pursue the collective good are unsatisfactory, leaving 
significant scope for vote-trading to shape decisions and voting outcomes. 
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